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Recognition of Foreign Relationships Under the Civil Partnership Act 
2004 
 
Introduction 
The 8QLWHG .LQJGRP¶V Civil Partnership Act 2004 came into effect on 5th 
December 2005, having received Royal Assent just over a year previously.  It 
creates an institution for same-sex couples, NQRZQ DV ³FLYLO SDUWQHUVKLS´
parallel to but separate from marriage, and it replicates most of the rules of 
civil marriage in terms of entry, consequences during subsistence, and 
termination.  Opposite-sex couples have no access to this new institution, just 
as same-sex couples have no access in the UK to the established institution 
of marriage.  Maintaining the exclusivity of both institutions to the different 
JHQGHU PL[HV ZDV FUXFLDO WR WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V SROLF\ LQ SURPRWLQJ WKH
legislation, designed to avoid the criticism that the Act represented an attack 
on the institution of marriage1.  The United Kingdom was by no means the first 
country to introduce civil partnership for same-sex couples: the credit goes to 
Denmark2, though that country was quickly followed in the 1990s by the other 
Scandinavian countries and in the early 2000s by an increasing number of 
western and central European countries.3  In addition, civil partnership has 
been introduced, by a variety of names (the most common of which are ³civil 
union´ and ³registered partnership´) in other (politically) western jurisdictions, 
such as some provinces and states in North America4, and New Zealand.5  
                                                 
1
 See Civil Partnership: A Framework for the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples (DTI, 
2003) at paras 2.7 ± 2.8 and Annex B; Civil Partnership Registration: A Legal Status for 
Committed Same-Sex Couples in Scotland (Scottish Executive 2003) at paras 5.7 ± 5.8. 
2
 Act No 372, Act of Registered Partnerships, 7
th
 June 1989.  For  English language 
GLVFXVVLRQVHH/1LHOVHQ³)DPLO\5LJKWVDQGWKHµ5HJLVWHUHG3DUWQHUVKLS¶LQ'HQPDUN´
,QW-/DZDQG)DP0%UREHUJ³7KH5HJLVWHUHG3DUWQHUVKLSIRU6DPH-sex Couples in 
Denmark´&K	)DP/4,/XQG-$QGHUVHQ³7KH'DQLVK5HJLVWHUHG3DUWQHUVKLS
$FW+DVWKH$FW0HDQWD&KDQJHLQ$WWLWXGHV"´LQ5:LQWHPXWH	0$QGHQDHVHGV
Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships (Hart, 2001) at pp 417 ± 426. 
3
 For a comparative study of nine European countries, see K Waaldijk (ed) More or Less 
Together: Levels of Legal Consequences of Marriage, Cohabitation and Registered 
Partnership for Different-Sex and Same-Sex Partners, INED, Paris 2005.  See http://www-
same-sex.ined.fr. 
4
 $YDOXDEOHUHYLHZRIWKH86VLWXDWLRQPD\EHIRXQGLQ/6LOEHUPDQ³6DPH-Sex Marriage: 
5HILQLQJWKH&RQIOLFWRI/DZV$QDO\VLV´83HQQ/5 
5
 For New Zealand, see the Civil Union Act 2004 , no 102 (13
th
 December 2004) (NZ).  One 
interesting difference between the UK and the New Zealand approach is in language.  In the 
UK, in what is probably another attempt to distance the new institution from marriage, the Act 
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Further, a small but increasing number of countries  -  the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Spain, Canada and the state of Massachusetts in the USA  -  have 
opened up the existing institution of marriage to same-sex couples.  Whether 
through marriage or civil partnership, then, same-sex couples in an increasing 
number of western countries have the means to have their relationship 
institutionalised by the state and recognised by the law. 
 
Given the mobility of the population in western countries the invention of civil 
partnership gave rise almost immediately to the question of foreign 
recognition6 and there is little doubt that UK courts will eventually face virtually 
all the questions of recognition of foreign civil partnerships that they have 
been facing in relation to marriage these two hundred years.  The 2004 Act 
anticipated this and makes extensive provision for private international law 
issues arising from civil partnership registered both here and abroad7.  It is the 
purpose of this article (i) to examine the UK statutory provisions relating to 
recognition of foreign relationships in order to see how they will operate in 
practice, (ii) to explore various questions to which the 2004 Act gives no ready 
                                                                                                                                            
WDONVDERXWFLYLOSDUWQHUVKLSVEHLQJ³UHJLVWHUHG´&LYLO3DUWQHUVKLS$FWVV and 137) 
ZKLOHWKH1HZ=HDODQG$FWWDONVRIFLYLOXQLRQVEHLQJ³VROHPQLVHG´DIWHUZKLFKOLNH
marriages, they are then registered): Civil Union Act 2004, s 14. 
6
 I am unaware of any discussion of private international law issues relating to same-sex 
coupOHVHDUOLHUWKDQP\RZQ³5HSURGXFWLYH7HFKQRORJLHV7UDQVVH[XDOLVPDQG
+RPRVH[XDOLW\1HZ3UREOHPVIRU,QWHUQDWLRQDO3ULYDWH/DZ´,&/4ZKHUH,
suggested that Danish registered partnerships affected status in exactly the same way as 
marriage did and that therefore the marriage recognition rules had to apply without 
TXDOLILFDWLRQ7KLVZDVVXSSRUWHGE\-0XUSK\LQ³7KH5HFRJQLWLRQRI6DPH-Sex Families in 
%ULWDLQ7KH5ROHRI3ULYDWH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ´,QW-/DZ3RO	)DP,
reWXUQHGWRWKHLVVXHLQDUDWKHUQDUURZHUFRQWH[WLQ³:RXOG6FRWV/DZ5HFRJQLVHD'XWFK
Same-6H[0DUULDJH"´(GLQ/5WKHDQDO\VLVLQZKLFKLVDVZHZLOOVHHRQO\
SDUWO\VXSHUVHGHGE\WKH&LYLO3DUWQHUVKLS$FW6HHDOVR)LRULQL³1HZ%HOJian Law on 
Same-6H[0DUULDJHVDQGLWV3ULYDWH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ,PSOLFDWLRQV´,&/4
The matter has been discussed rather more extensively in the North American literature: see 
IRUH[DPSOH7.HDQH³$ORKD0DUULDJH"&KRLFHRI/DZ$UJXPHQWVfor Recognition of Same-
6H[0DUULDJHV´6WDQ/51RWH³&RQIOLFWRI/DZVDQGWKH5HFRJQLWLRQRI6DPH-
6H[0DUULDJHV´+DUY/5/.UDPHU³6DPH-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws 
DQG3XEOLF3ROLF\´<DOH/-$*ULIILQ³$QRWKHU&DVH$QRWKHU&ODXVH-  
Same-6H[0DUULDJH)XOO)DLWKDQG&UHGLWDQGWKH866XSUHPH&RXUW¶V(YROYLQJ*D\5LJKWV
$JHQGD´>@3//6LOEHUPDQRSFLWQ7KLVOLWHUDWXUHDQGWKH86FDVHODZVHHIRU
example Rosengarten v. Downes 71 Conn App 372 (2002) (no jurisdiction in Connecticut to 
dissolve a Vermont civil union) and Lane v. Albanese 2005 WL 896129 (no jurisdiction in 
Connecticut to dissolve a Massachusetts same-sex marriage)) is stimulating but provides little 
real help in predicting KRZWKHSULYDWHLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZUXOHVLQWKH8.¶V&LYLO3DUWQHUVKLS$FW
2004 will be applied by the courts because the US analysis is nearly always intra-state rather 
than international and the major issue tends to be constitutional, as the works of Kramer and 
Griffin, above, show. 
7
 Civil Partnership Act 2004, part 5. 
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answer and, crucially, (iii) to assess the extent to which the private 
international law rules relating to civil partnership, insofar as they differ from 
those of marriage, might be argued to be for that reason inconsistent with the 
non-discrimination provisions in the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).  The institution of civil partnership engages art 8 of the ECHR (right 
to respect for family life) and, given that discrimination between couples on 
the basis of gender mix has been held by the European Court to be 
analogous to discrimination between individuals based on sex or sexual 
orientation8, art 14 therefore requires that there be shown to be a rational and 
proportionate reason for treating the two types of couple differently.  The 
assumption made throughout is that the purpose of the 2004 Act is to put 
same-sex registered couples in the same position as opposite-sex registered 
(i.e. married) couples, except to the extent to which it would be inappropriate 
to do so9.  The claims of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) 
community, including those of same-sex couples, for equality and to be free 
from unjustified discrimination are as strong in private international law as 
they are in relation to domestic rules of law.   This is not, however, a plea for 
identical rules (for I accept without reservation that some marriage rules are 
not appropriate for civil partnership) but a working premise that if the private 
international law rules for civil partnership are indeed different from those for 
marriage, there needs to be a good reason to justify the difference. 
 
This article does not attempt an analysis of all the private international law 
provisions in the 2004 Act.  Outwith its remit are the sections relating to the 
recognition of overseas dissolutions (which follow, virtually identically, the 
rules for recognition of overseas divorces10) and the more complex rules of 
jurisdiction.  The latter issue may well be at least as important (in practical 
terms) as those considered here, but an examination of its specialties will 
need to wait another day.  Recognition of the existence of the relationship 
itself is logically anterior to either of these issues and the way the 2004 Act 
                                                 
8
 Karner v. Austria [2003] 2 FLR 623.  See n 110 below and text thereto. 
9
 For example the non-extension to civil partnership of the organ-specific concepts of 
impotency (the sole ground in Scots law for holding a marriage to be voidable), 
consummation (lack of which leaves a marriage in England and Wales voidable) and adultery.  
Presumptions of paternity based on marriage are also inappropriate for civil partnership. 
10
 See n 113 below. 
 4 
deals with this recognition generates sufficient complexities to justify the 
limited examination offered here. 
 
 
PART ONE: THE GENERAL RECOGNITION RULE 
 
What is it that is Being Recognised? 
Though the concept of marriage takes on many guises across the world, it 
has long been assumed that every country in the world (i) has the legal 
institution of marriage in one form or another and (ii) knows what marriage in 
other countries is.  These assumptions, though questionable,11 render it 
unnecessary for the private international law rules of recognition of marriage 
to define the types of institutions that might be recognised, or to list the 
countries whose marriages are open to recognition.  Neither assumption, 
however, holds good with foreign civil partnerships, which exist in what is still 
a fairly VPDOOPLQRULW\RI WKHZRUOG¶VVWDWHVDQGZKLFK LQ WKDWVPDOOPLQRULW\
take a wide variety of forms.  So the Civil Partnership Act 2004, before 
providing recognition rules, GHOLPLWV WKURXJK WKH FRQFHSW RI ³RYHUVHDV
UHODWLRQVKLSV´ WKH W\SHV RI IRUHLJQ GRPHVWLF UHODWLRQV that are open to 
recognition through application of these rules.12  The definition of ³RYHUVHDV
UHODWLRQVKLSV´, contained in s 212(1), is in two (cumulative) parts. 
 
The first part of the definition concerns relationships in general.  To be an 
³RYHUVHDV UHODWLRQVKLS´ the relationship must either be one of the specified 
UHODWLRQVKLSVRULIQRWVSHFLILHGLWPXVWPHHWWKH³JHQHUDOFRQGLWLRQV´13.  The 
³VSHFLILHG UHODWLRQVKLSV´DUH OLVWHG LQ schedule 20 to the Act and include, for 
example, civil unions from Vermont, Connecticut and Quebec, domestic 
                                                 
11
 Sometimes the court has to determine whether the relationship before it is one of 
³PDUULDJH´WRZKLFKWKHPDUULDJHUHFRJQLWLRQUXOHVFDQDSSO\DVPRVWFRPPRQO\ZLWK
polygamous marriages, and also with institutions like concubinage which some countries 
recognise.  In Nachimson v. Nachimson [1930] P 217 the question was whether a relationship 
WKDWFRXOGEHHQGHGDWZLOOZDVWREHUHJDUGHGDVDPDUULDJHZKLFKLVD³XQLRQIRUOLIH´7KH
question was answered in the affirmative). 
12
 A precedent for this approaFKPD\EHIRXQGLQUHODWLRQWR³RYHUVHDVDGRSWLRQV´ZKLFKWREH
eligible for recognition, must come within the terms of the Adoption (Designation of Overseas 
Adoptions) Order 1973, SI 1973 No 19. 
13
 2004 Act, s 212(1)(a). 
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partnerships from California, Maine and Massachusetts, registered 
partnerships from Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands, 
Lebenspartnerschaften from Germany, pactes civile de solidarité (PaCS) from 
France, and same-sex marriages14 from Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and 
Canada.  The Secretary of State has the power to amend the list in schedule 
20 by adding a relationship, removing a relationship or amending the 
description of a relationship.15  If the relationship is not one of those explicitly 
specified then it will nevertheless be within the definition of ³RYHUVHDV
UHODWLRQVKLS´ LI it PHHWV ³WKHJHQHUDO FRQGLWLRQV´  7KHVH FRQGLWLRQVDUH WKDW
under the relevant law, (i) the relationship may not be entered into if either of 
the parties is already a party to a relationship of that kind or is lawfully 
married, (ii) the relationship is of indeterminate duration and (iii) the effect of 
entering the relationship is that the parties are treated as a couple either 
generally or for specified purposes or are treated as married16.  This provision 
is designed both to take account of the variety of forms that domestic 
relationships can take and to allow foreign changes of law to be recognised 
even before the Secretary of State has been able to react thereto17.  The aim 
is clearly to cover as many foreign relationships as possible, but there are 
likely to be many areas of doubt.  For example, in some countries couples 
who are not married can access some of the rights and responsibilities of 
marriage by registering their cohabitation18.  Such couples are likely to be 
FRYHUHG EHFDXVH WKH\ ZRXOG EH ³WUHDWHG DV D FRXSOH « for specified 
SXUSRVHV´  Other countries (including, incidentally, the United Kingdom19) 
permit some marriage-like consequences to cohabitants but do not provide a 
                                                 
14
 The approach of the Act is to convert foreign same-sex marriages into domestic civil 
partnerships: the effect of so doing is described in Part III below. 
15
 2004 Act, s 213(2). 
16
 2004 Act, s 214. 
17
 In the year between the passing of the Act and its coming into force, the number of 
jurisdictions introducing civil partnership almost doubled.  The most recent amendment to 
sched 20 is contained in the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (Overseas Relationships) Order 2005, 
SI 2005/3135 (November 11, 2005) which adds Andorra and Tasmania to the list of 
jurisdictions whose registered same-VH[UHODWLRQVKLSVDUH³VSHFLILHG´IRUWKHSXUSRVHRIV
212(1)(a). 
18
 0DQ\VWDWHVLQWKH86$IRUH[DPSOHKDYHHQDFWHG³5HFLSURFDO%HQHILWV$FWV´GHVLJQHGWR
be far less than marriage or civil partnership but with a variety of important legal 
consequences.  As representative, see Act Relating to Unmarried Couples 1997, Act 383, 
Hawaii. 
19
 See for example the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, the Housing Act 1988, and the Social 
Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992. 
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mechanism whereby the non-marital cohabitation can be registered.  In New 
South Wales, for example, extensive property rights can be claimed by 
cohabitants (in what are WKHUH FDOOHG ³GH IDFWR UHODWLRQVKLSV´ RSSRVLWH-sex 
and same-sex: cohabitants in that state are ³WUHDWHG DV D FRXSOH´ IRU WKH
purposes of, for example, financial provision on separation or on death20.  The 
requirement to satisfy the general conditions is designed to ensure that the 
only relationships open to recognition are monogamous, indefinite 
relationships which have at least some of the legal consequences of 
marriage. 
 
The second SDUW RI WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI ³RYHUVHDV UHODWLRQVKLSV´ FRQFHUQV
individual relationships which belong to a type that has satisfied the first part 
of the definition.  The individual relationship must (i) be registered with a 
responsible authority, (ii) be between two people of the same sex and (iii) be 
between two people neither of whom is presently married or in a civil 
partnership.21  The first condition will ensure that only institutionalised 
relationships are recognised: so for example unregistered cohabitations on 
the New South Wales model, however extensive the legal consequences 
thereof, are not open to recognition as civil partnerships under the Act.  The 
second condition ensures that in no circumstances can a relationship be 
recognised under the Act if the parties are of the opposite sex: this rule, 
reflecting the UK domestic rule, is likely to create substantial complexity in the 
application of the 2004 Act and is discussed further below. 
 
The Grounds for Recognition 
Once a foreign domestic relationshLS VDWLVILHV WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI ³RYHUVHDV
UHODWLRQVKLS´ LW ZLOO EH UHFRJQLVHG LQ WKH 8. DQG WUHDWHG KHUH DV D FLYLO
partnership (to which the UK domestic consequences will apply) if the 
grounds for recognition set out in s 215 are met.  These grounds, described in 
WKDWVHFWLRQDV³WKHJHQHUDOUXOH´22, DUHWKDWXQGHUWKH³UHOHYDQWODZ´, that is to 
                                                 
20
 See the Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (NSW). 
21
 2004 Act, s 212(1)(b). 
22
 The general rule is qualified (i) by subsidiary rules when one or both of the parties is 
domiciled in the UK and (ii) by the same-sex requirement. Both qualifications are discussed 
below. 
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say the law of the country or territory where the relationship is registered 
(including its rules of private international law),23 both parties had capacity to 
enter into the registered relationship and they met all thDWODZ¶V requirements 
necessary to ensure the formal validity of the relationship.24  The place of 
registration, in other words, governs both formalities and capacity.  Now, this 
may be contrasted with the rules for recognition of foreign marriage which, 
stated simply, provide that capacity to marry is determined by the antenuptial 
domicile of each party while the formalities of marriage are governed by the 
law of the place of celebration (the lex loci celebrationis)25.  This marriage rule 
has very recently been given statutory effect in Scotland,26 with the addition of 
a subsidiary rule when the lex loci is Scots law, that a rule of the Scottish 
internal law which makes a marriage void is to prevail over any law under 
which the marriage would be valid.27  The general rule is clearly different from 
the rule applying to marriage, but this does not in itself make the position 
discriminatory in ECHR terms.  There must be a difference in effect, and that 
difference must lack objective justification, before the rule can be said to be 
discriminatory.  Whether the different formulation between recognition of 
marriage on the one hand and of civil partnership on the other will make a 
difference in practice depends first upon what is understood by the concept of 
³FDSDFLW\´ ZLWKLQ WKH FRQWH[W RI V  DQG VHFRQGO\ RQ KRZ WKH SULYDWH
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZUXOHVRIWKHORFXVRSHUDWH³&DSDFLW\´LQUHODWLRQWRPDUULDJH
                                                 
23
 2004 Act s 212(2).  Renvoi, in other words, is explicitly part of the rule. 
24
 2004 Act s 215(1). 
25
 See Anton with Beaumont Private International Law (2
nd
 edn, 1990) at ch 16; Dicey and 
Morris The Conflict of Laws (13
th
 edn, 2000) at ch 17, Rules 67 and 68; Cheshire and North 
Private International Law (13th edn 1999) at ch 21; Clarkson and Hill, Jaffey on the Conflict of 
Laws (1997) ch 8.  That this has long been the approach in European jurisdictions is seen in 
von Bar Private International Law (2
nd
 edn, trans. Gillespie, 1892) at pp. 343-351, 358-359.  
The marriage rule is rather different in the USA where the issue is analysed on an inter-state 
rather than international basis, with a consequential higher emphasis on the place of 
celebration, and for that reason the few US cases on recognition of Massachusetts marriages 
and Vermont civil unions are of little assistance in Europe: see n. 6 above. 
26
 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s 38(1) and (2). 
27
 Ibid, s 38(3).  This means that Scots law applies to issues of age, forbidden degrees and 
capacity to and validity of consent for all marriages celebrated in Scotland.  The same result 
is achieved with civil partnership by s 86(1) of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, which provides 
that two people (implicitly, no matter what their personal law says) are not eligible to register a 
civil partnership in Scotland unless the Scottish rules on these (and other) matters are 
satisfied.  This reflects the English provision for civil partnership in s. 3, but there is not so 
clear a rule in English marriage law: on the role of the lex loci in questions of essential validity, 
see Cheshire & North (13
th
 edn) at pp 731-733.  The significance of the change of terminology 
IURP³FDSDFLW\´WRPDUU\WR³HOLJLELOLW\´WRHQWHUDFLYLOSDUWQHUVKLSLVGLVFXVVHGEHORZ 
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is often differentiated in the literature from issues of consent and is limited to 
issues like age, forbidden degrees, and prior relationships.28  This 
differentiation makes some sense in English law where lack of consent does 
not absolutely nullify a marriage (as incapacity would), but it makes little 
sense in Scots law where invalid consent does invalidate the marriage and 
consent, therefore, is logically seen as a part of capacity.29  In any case, in 
UHODWLRQ WR FLYLO SDUWQHUVKLS VLQFH ERWK ³FDSDFLW\´ DQG ³IRUPDO YDOLGLW\´ DUH
referred to the law of the place of registration, we must interpret this to mean 
that every aspect of validity of a civil partnership is either one or the other  -  
for no rule is given for any other aspect of validity and it may be assumed that 
the Act is designed to be comprehensive.  Put simply, the general rule is that 
all matters of validity of a civil partnership are referred to the law of the place 
RI UHJLVWUDWLRQ LQFOXGLQJ WKDW V\VWHP¶V UXOHV RI SULYDWH LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ
Clearly, this differs from marriage, where the rule is that formalities but not 
capacity are referred to the lex loci, but whether that creates a difference in 
effect will depend upon the private international law rules adopted by the law 
of the place of registration, as can be seen by considering the application of 
the rules in practice. 
 
 Scenario One 
A Dutch man registers in the Netherlands his partnership with a man of 
different nationality.  To be recognised in the UK, Dutch formalities 
must be followed (exactly as if an opposite-sex couple were marrying in 
the Netherlands).  But unlike marriage the question of capacity to enter 
a civil partnership is also referred to Dutch law as the lex loci.  
However, often this different rule will not lead to different results, 
because WKH³UHOHYDQWODZ´WKHlex loci) is expressly defined to include 
WKDWFRXQWU\¶VUXOHVRISULYDWHLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZSo if the lex loci (Dutch 
private international law, in our example) refers the issue of capacity to 
WKH SDUWLHV¶ SHUVRQDO ODZ then by renvoi the same result would be 
                                                 
28
 See for example Cheshire and North, 13
th
 edn at 721; Dicey & Morris 13
th
 edn (2000) at 
671 and 688; Jaffey (1997) at 307. 
29
 Anton and Beaumont, n 25 above, at 439-444; Clive Husband and Wife 4
th
 edn at 133.  And 
see Singh v. Singh 2005 SLT 749 where it was held that validity of consent was a matter to 
be determined by the law of the domicile.  This again locates consent within the parameters of 
capacity. 
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achieved for civil partnership as is achieved with the marriage rule 
which refers to personal law directly.  However, the Netherlands in fact 
follows the UK approach of applying its own domestic rules of capacity 
(eligibility) to all civil partnerships in the Netherlands30 with the result 
that Dutch capacity rules apply to both parties.  The Dutch private 
international law rule for marriage is that either Dutch law or the 
personal law must be satisfied, which is clearly more generous than the 
civil partnership rule.  But this will lead to a marriage being recognised 
where a civil partnership would be refused recognition only when the 
domestic rule of the Netherlands is less generous than the domestic 
rule of the personal law. 
  
Scenario Two 
Two women, aged 16 and 19, register a civil union in New Zealand, 
where the age of both marriage and civil union is 1631.  UK law will 
recognise this relationship as a valid civil partnership if the relevant law 
(the law of New Zealand) is satisfied on both formalities and capacity.  
If New Zealand private international law kept the matter of capacity or 
incapacity through nonage to itself as the lex loci (as both Dutch and 
UK law does) then the civil union would be recognised in the UK 
because both parties are (ex hypothesi) of full age in New Zealand: 
there is no difference here between marriage and civil partnership.  If, 
however, one of the women is a New Zealand national and the other is 
(say) Dutch and New Zealand private international law refers the 
PDWWHUWRWKHSDUWLHV¶SHUVRnal law32 then the civil union would be valid 
in New Zealand only so long as it is the younger who is the New 
Zealander (and so capable by her personal law) and the elder who is 
Dutch (and capable by her personal law): in these circumstances the 
relationship would be recognised as a civil partnership in the UK, just 
                                                 
30
 See the Dutch Act of 6 July 2004 on Private International Law, published in Staatsblad 15 
July 2004, nr. 334. 
31
 Civil Union Act 2004 (NZ), s.7 
32
 With studied ambiguity the Civil Union Act 2004 merely provides (through an amendment to 
the Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 31(2)) that nothing in the legislation shall affect the law as 
to the validity in New Zealand of a marriage or civil union that is not governed by the law of 
New Zealand. 
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as a marriage in these circumstances would be.  However, if it is the 
younger party who is from the Netherlands (where the age of marriage 
and civil partnership is 18) and New Zealand private international law 
refers the matter of capacity (eligibility to enter a civil partnership in 
New Zealand) to the personal law of each party, then the relationship 
would not be recognised in the UK because to apply the relevant law 
(New Zealand law, including its rules of private international law) would 
UHIHU WKH PDWWHU WR HDFK SDUW\¶V SHUVRQDO ODZ, by which the younger 
woman did not have capacity to register.  Again this would be the same 
result as in the case of marriage. 
  
It follows that referring issues of capacity to the lex loci as opposed to the 
ante-nuptial domicile will give different results vis-à-vis marriage and civil 
partnership only when the domestic rules of the locus are different for the two 
institutions.  But it would be the same if issues of capacity were referred by 
UK choice of law rules to the ante-registration domicile: that law may or may 
not treat capacity to enter a civil partnership differently from capacity to enter 
a marriage.  This means that the rule in the Civil Partnership Act 2004, while it 
may lead to a different result for marriage, does so by no different mechanism 
than the marriage rule (i.e. the acceptance of a foreign rule of law).  Both the 
marriage rule and the civil partnership rule permit a role to foreign private 
international law rules which may themselves refer to a discriminatory 
domestic rule and this is not in itself a basis for refusing to accept the result. 
 
Relationships with UK Connection: Parties Domiciled in UK 
Different considerations arise if one of the parties to an overseas relationship 
is domiciled in any part of the United Kingdom, for in that case certain extra 
requirements need to be satisfied beyond ³WKH JHQHUDO UXOH´ before the 
relationship will be recognised here.  Section 217 provides that if the overseas 
relationship has been registered abroad at a time when one or both of the 
parties was domiciled in England and Wales or Northern Ireland then the two 
people concerned are not to be treated as having formed a civil partnership if 
at the time of registration either of them is under 16 years of age, or they are 
within the forbidden degrees of relationship specified by English or Northern 
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Irish law33.  If one or both of the parties is domiciled in Scotland, then the 
same conditions apply and in addition the relationship will not be treated as a 
civil partnership if either is incapable of understanding the nature of civil 
partnership or of validly consenting to its formation.34  The effect of this is to 
import the stated aspects of capacity from the law of the domicile (if in the UK) 
as well as the law of the place of registration.   
 
 Scenario Three 
Two women, aged 15 and 19, register a civil partnership in Spain 
(where the age of marriage and civil partnership is 14).  If the 15-year-
old is domiciled in a UK jurisdiction this overseas relationship would not 
be entitled to recognition in the UK because of s 217(2)(a).  This is the 
same as with marriage.35  However, the same result follows if it is the 
British girl who is 19 (and so capable by her personal law) and the 
Spanish girl who is 15 (and capable by her personal law), and both 
have capacity by the law of the place of registration.  This overseas 
relationship would not be treated as a civil partnership in the UK, 
because the effect of s 217(2)(a) is that if either is domiciled in the UK, 
                                                 
33
 2004 Act, s 217(2) and (6). 
34
 2004 Act, s 217(4).  This additional requirement is necessary in the Scottish provisions 
since lack of valid consent in Scotland will render the civil partnership void while in England 
and Wales and in Northern Ireland, following the marriage rule (and to the bemusement of 
lawyers in Scotland), it merely renders the civil partnership voidable: 2004 Act, ss 50(1)(a) 
and 174(1)(a).  The stark difference between English and Scots law on this point can be 
illustrated by comparing Kaur v. Singh [1981] Fam L 152 where the English Court of Appeal 
rejected a petition for nullity of a marriage that parents had forced their son to enter into, with 
Singh v. Singh 2005 SLT 749 where the Scottish Court of Session followed a long line of 
similar cases (including Mahmud v. Mahmud 1994 SLT 599 where the facts are very much on 
a par with those in the English case) and granted the petition on the basis that there had been 
no true consent. 
35
 See the Marriage Act 1949, s 2, which provides the age limit for marriages solemnised in 
England and Wales and is assumed to impose an incapacity on all persons domiciled there 
(because it is a re-enactment of the Age of Marriage Act 1929).  See also the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973, s 11(a)(ii), though that is less clearly a rule of capacity since it provides as 
one of the grounds upon which a marriage will be void that either of the parties is under 16.  
The Scottish equivalent, s 1(1) of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, is much clearer to the 
effect that this is a matter of capacity attaching to all persons domiciled in Scotland and 
applying wherever in the world the marriage takes place.  But, crucially, there is no equivalent 
in Scotland to s 11(a)(ii) of the 1973 Act.  The same ambiguity is replicated for English law, 
and avoided for Scots law, in the Civil Partnership Act 2004.  Section 3, in the English part, 
imposes an age limit to registration as civil partners; section 86, in the Scottish part, imposes 
an age limit to registration in Scotland as civil partners. 
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both need to be of an age that they could enter into a civil partnership 
in the UK (even when the partnership is actually created abroad).36 
 
Now, English lawyers will not find this result particularly surprising as it is 
simply a statutory application of the English rule applicable to marriage: the 
rule in Pugh v. Pugh37 is that a marriage abroad involving a party domiciled in 
England is invalid if either of the parties is not of the English age of marriage.  
But Scots marriage law does not follow Pugh v. Pugh38 and so the application 
to civil partnership of the rule in Pugh creates a difference between marriage 
and civil partnership in that jurisdiction.  A 19 year old Scottish domiciliary 
may marry abroad a 15 year old, so long as the 15 year old has personal 
capacity and the place of celebration permits this.39  But a 19 year old Scottish 
domiciliary who enters into a civil partnership abroad with a 15 year old will 
not be able to have that relationship treated as a civil partnership in the UK 
because of the rule in s 217.  It is difficult to find an explanation why this 
difference in Scots law between marriage and civil partnership exists, other 
than as a result of this Scottish family law matter being dealt with by the 
Westminster Parliament which spent far more time on the English than the 
Scottish provisions.  In England the difference does not exist and so the 
question becomes why the two legal systems have a different approach to 
marriage.  Were Pugh to be overruled in England40 it would still leave the 
explicit rule for civil partnership which, in itself, has little or no justification.  
Even a policy objective of protecting minors does not explain Pugh since (i) 
protection is afforded to minors only when one of the parties is an English 
domiciliary and (ii) in the case itself it was the elderly colonel who was being 
SURWHFWHG³IURPWKHZLOHVRI>D@GHVLJQLQJ+XQJDULDQWHHQDJHU´.41  And in any 
case the question of validity of marriage (through a challenge to either 
formalities or capacity) might arise after many years of harmonious conjugal 
                                                 
36
 2004 Act, s 217(2)(a), (4) and (6)(a). 
37
 [1951] P 482. 
38
 Clive Husband and Wife (4
th
 edn 1997) at para 09.053; Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia of the 
Laws of Scotland Child and Family Law (Reissue, 2004) at para 626.  
39
 The requirement for both parties to be 16 applies only to marriages solemnised in Scotland: 
Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, s 1(2). 
40
 For sustained criticism of both the policy behind and the effect of Pugh, see J Murphy, 
International Dimensions in Family Law (2005) at 91-92. 
41
 Morris, Conflict of Laws 6th edn (2005, by D McClean and K Beevers) at para 9.025. 
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bliss42.  Were the younger in Scenario 3 to die after 40 years it would be 
harsh, but seemingly unavoidable, to deny the elder succession rights on 
intestacy.  Protection of minors does not explain this result. 
  
However, it is important to note that the rule in s 217 does not take away the 
UK GRPLFLOLDU\¶VFDSDFLW\WRHQWHULQWRDQRYHUVHDVUHODWLRQVKLS with a person 
under the UK age of capacity: the section states no more than that the parties 
are not to be treated as having formed a civil partnership.  There are two 
consequences to this.  First, the overseas relationship will be valid where it is 
entered into (for the UK Parliament cannot set out rules of eligibility to enter a 
foreign institution in a foreign country) and the result will be a limping civil 
partnership  -  valid in, and having legal effects in, the foreign country where it 
was registered, but invalid in the UK.  And secondly, the refusal to recognise 
the relationship as a civil partnership under the 2004 Act raises the question 
of whether it can be recognised as any other form of relationship.  If the 19 
year old Scotswoman and the 15 year old Spanish woman entered not a civil 
partnership but into a marriage instead and the 2004 Act does not convert that 
marriage into a UK civil partnership because of the age of the Spanish 
woman, does the rule for recognition of marriage (by which the relationship 
would not be denied recognition in Scotland on the basis of the foreign part\¶V
nonage) apply instead?  This is the same question, explored more fully later, 
of recognising the effects of a foreign opposite-sex civil partnership which 
similarly cannot be treated as a civil partnership here. 
 
Relationships with UK Connection: Registration in the UK 
,I WKH FLYLO SDUWQHUVKLS LV UHJLVWHUHG LQ WKH 8. LW LV QRW DQ ³RYHUVHDV
UHODWLRQVKLS´WRZKLFKWKHJHQHUDOUXOHLQVDSSOLHVNevertheless, just as 
validity of overseas relationships is governed by the law of the place of 
registration, so too ERWK ´IRUPDWLRQ DQG HOLJLELOLW\´ to enter into a civil 
partnership in the UK are governed by the domestic rules applicable in the 
                                                 
42
 As in Brook v. Brook (1861) 9 HLC 193 (11 years) and Berthiaume v. Dastous [1930] AC 79 
(13 years). 
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different jurisdictions in the UK.43  Private international law might still be 
relevant if one or both parties has little or no connection with this country. 
 
 Scenario Four 
Two men, Grigory Orlov and Grigory Alexandrovitch Potemkin, are 
domiciled in and nationals of Russia.  They travel to western Europe in 
order to enter into a civil partnership with each other. 
 
The countries involved in Scenarios 1 ± 3 have all themselves had legislation 
introducing a form of civil partnership into their domestic law.  Most countries 
in the world have not yet done so with the result that same-sex partnerships 
cannot be registered in such countries.  There is something ineluctably 
artificial in formulating the question in Scenario Four as one of capacity.  Mr 
and Mrs Brook sought to escape a recognised domiciliary incapacity when 
they married in Denmark, where marriages between men and their deceased 
ZLYHV¶VLVWHUVZHUHSHUPLWWHGEXWZKHQ0essrs Orlov and Potemkin enter a 
civil partnership in the UK the question of whether Russian law regards them 
as having the capacity to do so simply does not arise since Russian law 
knows nothing of civil partnership and so can neither grant nor withhold 
capacity to enter such an institution (unlike English law in Brook v. Brook44 
which could grant or withhold capacity to enter an institution that both it and 
Denmark had).  For this reason, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 limits its 
references to ³capacity´ to the law of the place of registration (which, of 
necessity, will have the institution) and, for more general purposes, refers to 
³HOLJLELOLW\´ WRHQWHUDFLYLOSDUWQHUVKLS.45  The rules for eligibility to register a 
civil partnership in the UK are the domestic rules contained in sections 3 
(England and Wales), 86 (Scotland) and 138 (Northern Ireland) and there is 
                                                 
43
 2004 Act, ss 2-4 (England and Wales), 85-86 (Scotland), and 137-138 (Northern Ireland). 
44
 (1861) 9 HLC 193. 
45
 Eligibility rather than capacity is a useful device for dealing with any institution existing in 
one country but not another.  For example, a couple from a country with no divorce (say, 
Malta) would be eligible to seek divorce in the UK (so long as jurisdictional rules were 
satisfied) and the question of capacity by their personal law to seek a change of status simply 
does not arise (though whether Maltese law would recognise a divorce granted in the UK is, 
of course, another matter, over which the UK legal system has no control).  Eligibility is, in 
fact, a more apt concept than capacity to describe non-status-based limitations such as 
forbidden degrees, as opposed to status-based limitations such as age. 
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no additional prerequisite of domiciliary capacity.  So if Messrs Orlov and 
Potemkin in Scenario Four travel to England, they may register a civil 
partnership there so long as they are eligible to do so by the English rules of 
eligibility in s 3 of the 2004 Act.  The fact that their relationship would have no 
effects in the law of their domicile is (notwithstanding that this leads to a 
limping relationship) irrelevant to the question of its validity within the UK 
under the 2004 Act.  A very different result would be reached if the place of 
registration were a country like Denmark which limits eligibility to its registered 
partnerships (but not its marriages) to couples one of whom is resident in or a 
citizen of Denmark.46  If our two Grigories travelled to Denmark, the law of the 
place of attempted registration would say that they were not eligible to enter 
into a civil partnership there and, not satisfying local law, any purported 
registration there would not be recognised here.  Rather unexpectedly, then, 
UK law is (in this respect at least) a little more gay-friendly than the law of the 
country that invented civil partnership. 
 
Public Policy 
A traditional exception to the recognition of foreign relationships, the public 
policy exception47, is given statutory effect in s 218 of the Civil Partnership Act 
2004, under which two people are not to be treated as having formed a civil 
partnership as a result of having entered into an overseas relationship if it 
would be manifestly contrary to public policy to recognise the capacity, under 
the relevant law, of one or both of them to enter into the relationship48.  This is 
                                                 
46
 Act No 372, Act of Registered Partnership, 7 June 1989, art 2(2), as amended by Act No 
360, 2 June 1999. 
47
 For a discussion within thHFRQWH[WRIPDUULDJHVHH7&+DUWOH\³7KH3ROLF\%DVLVRIWKH
(QJOLVK&RQIOLFWRI/DZVRI0DUULDJH´0/5$PRUHUHFHQWVXVWDLQHG
H[DPLQDWLRQRISXEOLFSROLF\ZLWKLQPDUULDJHLVSUHVHQWHGE\-0XUSK\³5DWLRQDOLW\DQG
Cultural Pluralism in the Non-5HFRJQLWLRQRI)RUHLJQ0DUULDJHV´,&/4ZKHUH
he exposes to light the inherent vagueness of the test.  He warns that too ready invocation of 
public policy can easily be seen in terms of judicial imperialism rather than adherence to 
some form of universal norm or social value, and that it runs the risk of leading to irrational 
and inconsistent decision-making. 
48
 The Scottish Parliament has recently put the public policy rule in relation to marriage into 
statutory form, with s 38(4) of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006.  The wording of this 
provision is distinctly odd.  While the civil partnership formulation allows non-recognition of a 
capacity otherwise governed by the relevant law, the new Scottish marriage formulation 
requires non-application of the law of the domicile in determining capacity if it would be 
contrary to public policy to apply that law.  This shifts the focus of public policy from the result 
of the foreign law to the very choice of the foreign law.  But it does not say which system 
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a sort of safety net to ensure that the heavy reliance on the local law to 
determine both formalities and capacity49 does not require UK courts to 
recognise a relationship where the rules for capacity are, to our eyes, 
outrageous50 (for example if the age of capacity were set below puberty).  As 
always with public policy it is to be remembered that the exception cannot be 
invoked just because the law is different, even radically so: it must be 
obnoxious to the whole legal and social polity of the forum.51  While civil 
partnership is limited to western liberal democracies with (relatively) uniform 
rules of capacity, the question of applying the public policy exception to 
foreign capacities presently lies in the realm of the hypothetical, and is likely 
to remain there for the foreseeable future.  The question of whether or not to 
recognise an incapacity does not arise under the statute, which focuses on 
GRPHVWLF UXOHV RI ³HOLJLELOLW\´ but it might be a live issue if reactionary 
jurisdictions pass legislation purporting to deny their citizens the capacity to 
enter into legally recognised same-sex relationships anywhere in the world52.  
It is submitted that such legislation cannot have effects in a country like the 
UK which permits civil partnership: it would be recognising extra-territorial 
HIIHFWRIDQRWKHUMXULVGLFWLRQ¶VUXOHVZKLFKDUHQRWRQO\different from ours but, 
arguably, contrary to the important social policy of gender- and sexuality-
equality that underlies the Civil Partnership Act 2004.  We should accept that 
a relationship entered into here might have no effects in another country, but 
DSHUVRQ³HOLJLEOH´E\8.UXOHVVKRXOGEHUHJDUGHGDV³FDSDEOH´DQGDIRUHLJQ
incapacity based on nothing more than a desire to deny same-sex 
relationships any legal status should be rejected as contrary to our public 
                                                                                                                                            
determines capacity if the otherwise appropriate law cannot do so and one assumes that 
Scots law (the lex fori) would apply as a default. 
49
 And it is interesting that the public policy exception is limited in its terms to matters of 
capacity and not matters of form. 
50
 ³2IIHQVLYHWRWKHFRQVFLHQFHRIWKHFRXUW´LQWKHZRUGVRI6LPRQ3LQCheni v. Cheni [1965] 
P 85 at 99. 
51
 ³7KHUHIXVDOWRUHFRJQLVHIRUHLJQODZDQGULJKWVDQGVWDWXVDULVLQJIURPLWLVH[FHSWLRQDOLQ
6FRWVODZ«,Q(QJODQGWKHSUoposition gains support from the case of Addison v. Brown 
>@:/5´$QWRQ	%HDXPRQWQDERYHDW6HHDOVR&KHVKLUH	1RUWK, n 25 
above at 733-734. 
52
 In fact the imperative tends to be to protect marriage from the ³threat´ of same-sexuality 
and incapacity to enter same-sex marriage is imposed rather than incapacity to enter civil 
partnership.  See as an example the Australian Marriage Amendment Act 2004 which 
provides that no same-VH[UHODWLRQVKLSFDQEHUHJDUGHGLQ$XVWUDOLDDVD³PDUULDJH´WKLVGRHV
not remove capacity (or indeed deny recognition of a foreign relationship as something other 
than marriage). 
 17 
policy (exactly as we would have rejected a denial of capacity to enter into a 
mixed race relationship). 
  
 
PART TWO: THE SAME-SEX REQUIREMENT 
 
Introduction 
Though the catalyst for the creation of civil partnership has almost universally 
been the desire to provide a mechanism whereby access to the rights and 
subjection to the responsibilities of family life can be extended to same-sex 
couples, some legal systems, including Belgium, the Netherlands, France and 
New Zealand, have extended the availability of their version of the new 
institution to opposite-sex couples also, on the ground of choice.53  This is 
quite contrary to the approach in the UK, where the Civil Partnership Act 2004 
takes great pains to limit access to British civil partnerships to couples who 
are of the same sex as each other.  This difference of approach will give rise 
to at least two problems for UK courts  -  whether to recognise opposite-sex 
civil unions entered into abroad, and how to determine gender for the purpose 
of satisfying the same-sex requirement. 
 
Recognition of Opposite-Sex Civil Partnership 
Scenario Five  
A man and a woman, who are domiciled in New Zealand, disapprove of 
marriage but register their relationship there as a civil union.  They 
move to the United Kingdom, but the relationship breaks down.  The 
parties go to a UK court seeking dissolution, for both are seeking to 
marry other people in this country. 
 
Validity of the civil partnership is a preliminary question to the jurisdiction of 
the court.54  The question here is whether the parties have any relationship at 
all that a UK court could dissolve, and if so under what provision would the 
                                                 
53
 For the European countries, see Waaldijk, n 3 above; for New Zealand, see the Civil Union 
Act 2004, s4(1). 
54
 See, in relation to marriage, A-M v. A-M (Divorce: Jurisdiction: Validity of Marriage) [2001] 2 
FLR 6. 
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court act?  These questions might be avoided by the parties (or one of them) 
simply returning to New Zealand, but that might not be possible in all cases 
and even it if were it would raise the question of whether there is a legitimate 
basis upon which opposite-sex civil partners can be obliged to go to that 
expense when same-sex civil partners can avoid it by accessing what is now 
their local court.  A UK court faced with these questions is unlikely to be able 
to answer them simply by telling to parties to try another court: the UK forum  
is not in Scenario Five non conveniens.  The matter needs to be dealt with by 
legal analysis and there are at least six possible approaches that the UK court 
might adopt in attempting to answer the questions posed above. 
 
First, the UK court might simply conclude that there is no relationship between 
the parties that can be recognised at all: it is neither opposite-sex marriage 
nor same-sex civil partnership and the domestic rules, including the 
dissolution provisions, available to the UK courts are designed for these two 
forms of conjugal relationship and none other.  This, in effect, would be to 
follow the approach of Lord Penzance in the old case of Hyde v. Hyde55 
where he held that the English court had no jurisdiction to dissolve a 
polygamous union because the domestic process was designed for 
monogamous unions only.  However, this is an implausible argument in the 
context of opposite-sex civil partnership, for a number of reasons.  First, the 
Hyde approach proved unsustainable in the long-term.56  Secondly, to refuse 
to recognise an opposite-sex civil partnership as anything at all seems 
punitive without purpose since there is no obvious basis upon which to regard 
the couple as any less worthy of recognition than a married opposite-sex 
couple or a civilly enpartnered same-sex couple.  While it might be argued 
that the denial of civil partnership to opposite-sex couples is necessary to 
ensure that they choose the institution of marriage when they wish to have 
their relationship registered with the state, such a political imperative can be 
legitimate only within the domestic sphere:  the UK Parliament and UK courts 
have no business in protecting the New Zealand institution of marriage in a 
                                                 
55
 (1866) LR 1 P&D 130. 
56
 6HH.1RUULH³:RXOG6FRWV/DZ5HFRJQLVHD'XWFK6DPH-6H[0DUULDJH"´(GLQ
LR 147 at pp 151 ± 154. 
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way that the New Zealand Parliament has deliberately rejected.  And in any 
case to refuse all recognition of a New Zealand civil union between an 
opposite-sex couple would, if the couple had converted from a marriage to a 
civil union,57 amount to UK law holding that a couple who went through a 
process to change the name but not the status or consequences of their 
UHODWLRQVKLS KDYH HIIHFWLYHO\ DQG TXLWH FRQWUDU\ WR WKHLU RU WKHLU VWDWH¶V
intention) divorced (non-judicially).  Such a result would be unconscionable  -  
and if the divorce analysis is accurate it must be rejected under the authority 
of s 51(3)(c) of the Family Law Act 198658.  Thirdly, the approach goes 
against every policy applicable to the private international law of families  -  
certainty, giving effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties, 
international comity, and avoiding limping relationships.59  And fourthly the 
approach would leave the parties in an unacceptable position, arrived at only 
by denying the New Zealand relationship while at the same time giving effect 
to one of its consequences.  Remember that the parties are seeking 
dissolution in order to free themselves to marry other people.  But so long as 
they retain their New Zealand domiciles they will be not free to marry or to 
enter into a civil partnership anywhere, because their domicile regards them 
as civilly enpartnered and in UK eyes domiciliary incapacities are carried 
around the world (subject to s 50 of the Family Law Act 1986)60.  Ignoring the 
relationship entirely is the least acceptable approach. 
 
A second option for a court asked to recognise an opposite-sex civil 
partnership for the purpose of bringing it to an end would be to say that the 
relationship must be either a civil partnership or a marriage and that since the 
Civil Partnership Act 2004 prevents it from being treated as a civil partnership 
                                                 
57
 3HUPLWWHGXQGHUVRI1HZ=HDODQG¶V&LYLl Union Act 2004. 
58
 Non-recognition of divorce on the basis that it would be manifestly contrary to public policy 
to recognise it: I submit it would be manifestly so contrary to separate parties against their 
wills and intention. 
59
 For an examination of the relevant policies, see Hartley n. 47 above. 
60
 For Scotland, see the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, s 5(4)(f). To enter a second civil 
partnership both parties must have the status of single person (2004 Act, ss 3(1)(b), 86(1)(d), 
138(1)(b) and 212(1)(b)(ii)).  That status is determined by the law of the domicile.  Of course, 
the parties might well have acquired a domicile in the UK and lost their New Zealand domicile, 
but there is no principle of private international law that states that a relationship dissolves 
through a change of domicile.  Wherever the parties are domiciled, New Zealand law at any 
rate will continue to regard them as enpartnered and not free to repartner. 
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it must, of necessity, be treated as a marriage (however it is described in the 
country of its creation).  The common law rules on recognition of marriage61 
would then apply and, if satisfied, the parties in Scenario Five would have 
access to the divorce court under the applicable divorce legislation.  There 
would, however, be something distinctly odd in the UK court recognising and 
treating as a marriage a relationship created in a foreign land as an alternative 
to marriage and entered into by a couple who explicitly rejected the notion of 
marriage when they formalised their relationship by registering it as something 
else.  Nevertheless, there is some (if slight) authority for an approach such as 
this.  In Lee v. Lau62 a marriage was held to be potentially polygamous since, 
by its ORFDO ODZ WKH KXVEDQG ZDV HQWLWOHG WR WDNH ³VHFRQGDU\ ZLYHV´ RU
concubines.  Concubinage as such is not recognised in any form and so it 
ZDV WUHDWHGDVD IRUPRIPDUULDJHRQDSDUZLWKPDUULDJHZLWK WKH³SULPDU\
ZLIH´QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKDWLWZRXOGQRWbe so treated by the local law.  Here, it 
may well be tempting for UK courts to treat as a marriage a New Zealand 
relationship which is not marriage in New Zealand but which nevertheless has 
all the attributes (except the name) of marriage  -  including, crucially, the 
gender mix required for marriage in the UK.  But this approach has 
discriminatory implications.  It is to be remembered that treating an opposite-
sex civil partnership as a marriage would have wider consequences than 
access to divorce (including use of an extra ground for divorce): it would give 
them more than they asked for.  It would for example entitle the couple jointly 
to adopt a child in Scotland, notwithstanding that by their own law they would 
not be married; it would entitle the Scottish court (if one of the parties were 
domiciled in Scotland) to ignore a flaw in the formalities with ceremonies 
abroad63.  The fact that a same-sex civil partnership is not converted into a 
marriage (or a same-sex marriage treated as a marriage) and awarded these 
benefits means that the rule becomes necessarily discriminatory on the basis 
of sexual orientation because its effects, while marriage carries greater 
benefits than civil partnership, is to preference opposite-sex couples over 
same-sex couples.  There is also a conceptual difficulty with this approach 
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 Now statutory in Scotland: Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s 38. 
62
 [1967] P 14. 
63
 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s 3(3) and (4).  (Various other conditions must, it is 
admitted, also be satisfied before foreign flaws will be ignored). 
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which is that, at heart, it is little more than an assertion that state-sanctioned 
relationships between same-sex couples are, by definition, civil partnerships 
while state-sanctioned relationships between opposite-sex couples are, by 
definition, marriage.  This may well be the UK approach but the point of 
private international law is not to insist upon domestic definitions but to give 
effect, where appropriate, to foreign definitions.  This approach, therefore, 
while it achieves recognition, does so at the cost of principle and needs to be 
rejected for that reason. 
 
A third approach to the question of recognition of an opposite-sex civil 
partnership is to accept the reality that the relationship is not a marriage but is 
in both fact and in (overseas) law a civil partnership.  This, however, would 
seem to be ruled out by the clear terms of s 216(1) of the 2004 Act, which 
provides that two people are not to be treated as having formed a civil 
partnership as a result of having registered an overseas relationship if they 
were not of the same sex under UK law.  Whether the failure of UK domestic 
law to recognise an opposite-sex civil partnership in circumstances in which it 
would recognise a same-sex civil partnership is inconsistent with the right to 
respect for family life, as protected by art 8 of the ECHR, is in substance the 
same question as that arising from the refusal to recognise a foreign same-
sex marriage (as a marriage) and that question is considered in the final part 
of this article.  In any case, the wording of s 216(1) is so clear that, even if an 
inconsistency with the ECHR could be found it would not be possible to 
interpret the provision to mean exactly the reverse of what it says.  Even if a 
declaration of incompatibility were made under s 4 of the Human Rights Act 
1998, the recognition question is not answered. 
 
A fourth approach would be to regard the relationship between the parties as 
essentially contractual with the result that the conflicts rules relating to 
contract64 would apply.  But this seems needlessly complex and artificial.  The 
relationship is no more contractual in New Zealand than a same-sex civil 
union or an opposite-sex marriage; the incidents of marriage and civil 
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 Including, for countries in the European Union, those contained in the Rome Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. 
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partnership are attached (at least in New Zealand); New Zealand law will 
regard the relationship as one affecting status and its consequences will 
clearly affect status here  -  including, as a litmus test, effects of the 
relationship on capacity to remarry65.  Murphy66 offers a persuasive argument 
why regarding civil partnerships as mere contracts is misconceived.  His most 
important argument is that freedom to negotiate terms, an important principle 
in contract, is entirely absent in marriage or civil partnership.  A contract 
analysis to resolve the question of opposite-sex civil partnership must, it is 
suggested, be rejected. 
 
The fifth approach, and the one preferred here, would be for the courts to 
develop a non-statutory method of giving effect to the consequences of 
relationships that cannot be recognised under the statute: the 2004 Act 
prevents opposite-sex civil partnerships registered abroad from being treated 
as UK civil partnerships but it does not in its terms prohibit all recognition for 
all purposes.  Indeed, we have already seen that one consequence of the 
relationship (the imposition of marital incapacity) has to be given effect to in 
the UK whether or not the relationship itself is recognised.  Without treating 
the relationship formally as either a marriage or a civil partnership the court 
could fashion appropriate recognition rules, and could do so based on the 
existing rules for these two separate institutions.  The marriage rules 
themselves had to develop by judicial decision and there is no conceptual 
reason why common law rules could not be developed judicially for civil 
partnerships that are not statutory ³RYHUVHDV UHODWLRQVKLSV´  In much the 
same way the courts gave recognition to (or, more correctly, gave effect to 
some consequences of) polygamous unions without recognising such unions 
WREH³PDUULDJHV´  The recognition rules for marriage and for civil partnership 
are, in any case, similar in effect, even if structured rather differently in 
respect to capacity.  To fashion a similar rule for relationships not covered by 
the 2004 Act would not be an illegitimate extension of that Act (even if the 
same result is reached) but a modification of the existing rule applicable to 
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 A contractual agreement not to remarry is not, even if not contrary to public policy, capable 
RIDIIHFWLQJDSHUVRQ¶VVWDWXVRUPDULWDOFDSDFLW\ 
66
 n. 40 above at 81-83. 
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marriage and its extension to the marriage-like (but definitely non-marital) 
relationship of opposite-sex civil partnership.  It would be neither surprising 
nor unacceptable if the most appropriate formulation of this new judicially 
developed rule for recognition were to be for all intents and purposes identical 
to the statutory rules for same-sex civil partnership for, I suggest, opposite-
sex civil partnership is closer in form and should be closer in effect to same-
sex civil partnership than to opposite-sex marriage67.   
 
A criticism of this approach might be that while it would work easily in the 
context, say, of succession or determining the existence of a marital 
incapacity, it is less obviously a suitable solution with the statutory process of 
dissolution (with which, it will be remembered, statutory intervention was 
necessary to ensure access to those married polygamously).  The relationship 
must be a marriage before access to the divorce court under the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 or the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 can be granted, and it 
must be a civil partnership before access to the dissolution court under the 
Civil Partnership Act 2004 can be granted.  If for no other reason, the parties 
need to know which forms to use.  This criticism would appear, however, to be 
little more than undue legalism if it meant that parties from overseas in a valid 
conjugal relationship were unable to escape that relationship.  It is to be 
remembered that (other than adultery) the grounds for divorce and 
dissolution, and the processes, are the same in the UK for marriage and civil 
partnership and to deny access to the courts for want of an appropriate form 
and no more substantial reason is, surely, a disproportionate response to 
those seeking the remedy.  Where adultery is not the ground, nothing is lost 
by allowing opposite-sex civil partners the choice of terminating their 
relationship by either the Civil Partnership Act 2004 or the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973.  The denial to opposite-sex civil partners of the ground of 
adultery is a cost easily borne: if they wanted that as a possible ground they 
had the choice (unlike, incidentally, same-sex couples) of getting married. 
 
                                                 
67
 In countries where opposite-sex couples have the choice of marriage or civil partnership, to 
choose the latter is to positively reject the marital benefits of adoption rights in Scotland and 
adultery. 
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There is a sixth solution, mentioned here simply for the sake of completeness, 
which would give the parties a remedy without requiring the relationship to be 
recognised as either a marriage or a civil partnership or as anything else.  
This would be for the parties to seek a declarator of nullity (and with it 
ancillary relief or financial provision), on the basis that the relationship is of the 
wrong gender-mix for civil partnership  -  just as nullity of marriage was 
declared in Corbett v. Corbett68 on that same basis.  But the 2004 Act does 
not nullify foreign civil partnerships of the wrong gender mix.  The relationship 
was valid when entered into (unlike the relationship in Corbett) and all the 
2004 Act does is to prevent it being treated in the UK as a civil partnership.  
So some element other than gender mix would be necessary to succeed in an 
action of nullity. This approach is a dead end. 
  
The Definition of Gender and Transsexual Issues 
The same-sex requirement in the 2004 Act creates another set of problems of 
some awkwardness, which the Act tries to anticipate but does not fully 
resolve.  These arise from the different approaches in different countries to 
the question of determining whether or not a couple are of the same gender.  
Of course this will normally be straightforward but it will not be so if one of the 
parties is living their life in the gender other than that in which they were 
apparently born.69 
 
Within the private international law provisions of the 2004 Act, the same-sex 
requirement appears in two separate places.  First s 212, in defining those 
³RYHUVHDV UHODWLRQVKLSV´ that are available for recognition, requires that the 
parties to the relationship must be of tKHVDPHVH[³XQGHUWKHUHOHYDQW ODZ´
that is to say the law of the country or territory where the relationship is 
registered.70  It will be a matter of proof of foreign law whenever a UK court is 
asked to determine whether an acquired gender is or is not recognised by the 
foreign legal system.  But even if the parties are of the same sex according to 
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 [1971] P 83. 
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 Different responses to hermaphroditism may well give rise to similar problems but in a 
(possibly vain) attempt to retain some clarity the present discussion will be limited to the 
difficulties created by transsexuality. 
70
 2004 Act, s 212(1)(b)(i). 
 25 
WKH SODFH RI UHJLVWUDWLRQ DQG WKHLU UHODWLRQVKLS WKHUHIRUH DQ ³RYHUVHDV
UHODWLRQVKLS´) it will not be treated in the UK as a civil partnership, even if the 
requirements for recognition in s 215 are otherwise satisfied, if, at the critical 
time,71 the parties were not also of the same sex by UK law.  This rule, 
contained in s 216(1), means that the parties must be of the same sex by both 
the lex loci registrationis and UK law.  How UK law determines gender for the 
purpose of civil partnership is open to some doubt.  Marriage is easy, because 
of authoritative judicial guidance in that context.  Gender is initially determined 
by the rule in Corbett v. Corbett72 and confirmed in Bellinger v. Bellinger73 that 
biological factors are determining; but since April 2005 the acquisition of a 
gender recognition certificate under the Gender Recognition Act 2004 will 
allow a person biologically of one gender to be recognised for most purposes 
of law, including marriage, as belonging to the other gender.  However, such a 
certificate is available only to persons who are neither married nor in a civil 
partnership, with the result that marital/civil status must be determined before 
a gender recognition certificate is applied for.  If the applicant is a party to a 
recognised civil partnership or marriage, only an interim gender recognition 
certificate may be granted,74 the sole effect of which is to provide a ground to 
dissolve the existing marriage or civil partnership,75 so freeing the parties to 
enter a civil partnership or marriage respectively.  But without the certificate a 
marriage between parties one of whom had changed gender before its 
celebration is not recognised76 and so a full gender recognition certificate may 
be applied for. 
 
Whether such a certificate is needed in UK law for the purposes of entering 
into civil partnership here (or recognising a foreign civil partnership) is a much 
more difficult question.  A gender recognition certificate is needed within the 
context of marriage to get over the biological imperative that lay at the heart of 
the decisions in Corbett and Bellinger.  But there is no biological imperative to 
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 I.e. the time of registration: 2004 Act, s 215(2). 
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 [1971] P 83. 
73
 [2003] UKHL 21. 
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 Gender Recognition Act 2004, s 4(3). 
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 Ibid, sched. 2. 
76
 Neither is it a civil partnership (Civil Partnership Act 2004, s 216(1)) nor a marriage (Gender 
Recognition Act 2004, s 21(1) and (2)). 
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get over with civil partnership, in respect of which procreative potential is self-
evidently irrelevant. In another area where procreative potential is irrelevant, 
equal treatment in employment, the House of Lords (subsequent, be it noted, 
to Bellinger v. Bellinger) held in A v. Chief Constable, West Yorkshire Police77 
WKDWDSHUVRQ¶VDFTXLUHGJHQGHUFRXOGEHUHFRJQLVHGHYHQZLWKRXWDJHQGHU
recognition certificate,78 in circumstances in which recognition of the new 
gender furthered rather than inhibited the statutory policy behind the gender-
specific rule.  Limiting civil partnership to couples of the same sex is a gender-
specific rule, and the question becomes whether the purpose of that rule is 
better served by applying Bellinger (and requiring a gender recognition 
certificate before the acquired gender is recognised) or applying A v. West 
Yorkshire Police (and recognising the acquired gender even without a gender 
recognition certificate).  It would appear that there are two purposes to the 
limiting of civil partnership in the UK to couples of the same sex: (i) to 
emphasise the difference from marriage, which is opposite-sex, and (ii) to 
maintain the importance of marriage by denying opposite-sex couples the 
choice of entering into other legally recognised relationships that are not 
marriage79.  The question of whether a civil partnership is available without a 
gender recognition certificate will not arise very often in the domestic sphere, 
for a transgendered person wishing to register a civil partnership in the UK 
with a person of their acquired gender will in practice be advised to obtain a 
gender recognition certificate first80.  But in other countries parties will not 
normally have sought a UK certificate before registering their partnership 
abroad81.  If an overseas relationship is entered into by two parties one of 
whom used to be of the opposite sex to the other but who now lives his or her 
life and presents to the world as the same sex as the other, and the couple 
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 In fact the case was decided before the Gender Recognition Act 2004 was enacted and so 
no such certificates were available for anyone. 
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 These aims underlie most Government pronouncements on civil partnership: see n. 1 
above.  A quite different philosophy was adopted by the New Zealand Parliament, which not 
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to convert their relationship into a civil union and (opposite-sex) civil partners to convert to 
marriage: Civil Union Act 2004, s 18. 
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 And it may well be that district registrars will refuse to permit registration without such a 
certificate. 
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 Though in fact they may do so since there is no domiciliary or nationality or residence 
condition to be fulfilled before making an application to a UK Gender Recognition Panel. 
 27 
are regarded by the relevant law as a same-sex couple, there is a strong 
argument to suggest that maintaining the same-sex requirement is furthered 
rather than inhibited by UK law also recognising the change of sex  -  for this 
purpose.  If this is so then the reasoning in A v. West Yorkshire Police 
suggests that a British court could recognise that a person has changed 
gender in the eyes of UK law, for the purpose of satisfying the same-sex 
requirement in s 216(1), without requiring that person to seek a UK gender 
recognition certificate: the court simply needs to be satisfied that the 
relationship appears for all intents and purposes to be, and to function as, a 
same-sex relationship.  
 
The 2004 Act, however, assumes that a gender recognition certificate will be 
sought in such circumstances and makes explicit provision that, when 
granted, the relationship will be recognised.  Section 216(2) neutralises the 
effect of s 216(1)82 by allowing the recognition of the overseas relationship 
regarded as same-sex by the relevant law but not by UK law, if a gender 
recognition certification is obtained subsequent to the relationship having 
been established (as same-sex) abroad.  The relationship, now same-sex in 
both UK law and the foreign law, can be recognised as a civil partnership83 
and that recognition is retrospective.  The very fact that this provision explicitly 
deals with the conversion, in UK eyes, of an overseas relationship into a 
same-sex relationship might be taken to imply that this is the only means of 
recognising a foreign change of gender.  But that is to read more into the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 (and the Gender Recognition Act 2004) than is actually 
there.  In the domestic sphere, A v. West Yorkshire Police shows us that the 
Gender Recognition Act 2004 is not the only means by which a change of 
gender may be given effect to in UK law. To read s 216(2) as imposing a 
requirement on foreign transsexuals to utilise the Gender Recognition Act 
would not only deny them opportunities available to UK transsexuals but 
would also leave some parties in a very unfortunate position because the UK 
gender recognition process will not always be available. 
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 The provision requiring the parties to be of the same sex by UK law. 
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 Unless a valid marriage or civil partnership has been entered into before the acquisition of 
the gender recognition certificate: s 216(3). 
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 Scenario Six  
A couple in New Zealand enter into a civil XQLRQXQGHU WKDWFRXQWU\¶V
Civil Union Act 2004, one of them having previously been recognised 
by New Zealand law as having changed gender.84  They move to the 
UK but the relationship breaks down and they seek dissolution under 
the Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
 
 
 
Scenario Seven 
A couple in New Zealand enter into a civil XQLRQXQGHU WKDWFRXQWU\¶V
Civil Union Act 2004, one of them having previously been recognised 
by New Zealand law as having changed gender.85  They remain in New 
Zealand but own immoveable property in the UK; the transgendered 
partner dies intestate and the other seeks to inherit the UK property 
under the terms of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (which gives civil 
partners succession rights identical to those of spouses86). 
 
In both these scenarios, the claim is dependent on the recognition in the UK 
of the New Zealand civil union, which itself is dependent on the relationship 
being regarded as same-sex both by New Zealand law and by UK law.  If both 
relationships are regarded by the law of the place of registration as being 
same-sex relationships, then these New Zealand civil unions are both 
³RYHUVHDVUHODWLRQVKLSV´LQWHUPVRIV(which refers gender to the relevant 
law)87.  These overseas relationships satisfy the recognition rules in s 215 
since (ex hypothesi) the parties had capacity under New Zealand law and met 
all the formal requirements of New Zealand law.  But s 216(1) prevents 
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 Permitted, for all purposes including marriage, without official process in New Zealand: 
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recognition in the UK if the parties are not of the same sex under UK law.88    
Neither couple is same-sex if we assume that the only way in UK law of 
changing gender is through the mechanism of the Gender Recognition Act. 
On that assumption, neither relationship is recognised, all four parties are 
single, and the transgendered party in Scenario Six can seek and acquire89 a 
gender recognition certificate, activating s 216(2) which gives retrospective 
recognition of the same-sex nature of the relationship and thereby of the 
relationship itself.  In Scenario Six then, the couple, once in possession of a 
gender recognition certificate, can seek dissolution of their relationship under 
the Civil Partnership Act 2004.  Section 216(2) provides a satisfactory 
solution. 
 
But this solution works only in its own context.  If the assumption that the 
Gender Recognition Act is the only way of changing gender in the UK is true, 
then a very different result follows in Scenario Seven, in which a gender 
recognition certificate is not available  -  for the simple reason that the 
transgendered partner is dead and it cannot be sought by anyone else.  If the 
Gender Recognition Act is the only way in UK law of changing gender then 
WKHGHFHDVHG¶VFKDQJHRIJHQGHUFDQnever be recognised, consequently the 
overseas relationship is not recognised, and the surviving partner will be 
treated in the UK as a stranger to the deceased and denied any succession 
rights to UK property.  There are two ways of avoiding this unacceptable 
result.  First, we might treat the New Zealand civil union as an opposite-sex 
civil partnership and seek to recognise it in the way suggested above.  
Secondly, we could challenge the proposition that the process in the Gender 
Recognition Act is the only way of changing gender in the UK, on the 
argument that that Act did not overrule A v. West Yorkshire Police.  The first 
approach would be offensive to the parties and lead to unnecessary gender 
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 It is probably not open to argument that the reference to UK law in s 216(1) includes UK 
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applicant has changed gender under the law of another country: Gender Recognition Act 
2004, ss 1(1)(b) and 2(2). 
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confusion between two legal systems.  The second approach is, it is 
suggested, the more certain and less clumsy way of ensuring that the survivor 
in Scenario Seven is not disinherited.  A v. West Yorkshire Police suggests 
that a change of gender will be recognised even without a gender recognition 
certificate if that is the best way of achieving the purpose of the gender-
specific rule at issue.  The purpose of the same-sex requirement in the Civil 
Partnership Act is to ensure that civil partnerships look like and function as 
same-sex relationships as opposed to opposite-sex relationships.  It is not 
(and cannot be) to further any biological imperative (or indeed to limit any right 
of succession).  If so, then that purpose is advanced by UK law recognising 
that a couple who had lived their lives and presented to the world as a same-
sex couple were in fact, and for the purposes of UK civil partnership law, of 
the same gender.  It is suggested that A v. West Yorkshire Police permits the 
recognition of an acquired gender for the purpose of succession rights 
dependent upon the deceased being recognised as having changed gender.  
The survivor in Scenario Seven is therefore able to establish, in the eyes of 
UK law, the same-sex nature of the civil partnership in question, thereby 
satisfying s 216(1), and to have the relationship recognised under the 2004 
Act. 
 
But, once again, that solution works only in its own context and not in others.  
It would not work if the foreign relationship were a marriage rather than a civil 
partnership, regarded as opposite-sex in the foreign country only because a 
gender change has been recognised there.  If, say, New Zealand law 
recognises a SHUVRQ¶V change of gender and the transgendered person 
marries there, the New Zealand marriage would not be recognised in the UK 
because of the rule, analogous to s 216(1), in s 21(1) and (2) of the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004, which SURYLGHV WKDW D SHUVRQ¶V JHQGHU LV QRW WR EH
regarded as having changed by reason only that it has changed under a 
foreign law, and that accordingly a person is not to be regarded as being 
married by reason of having entered into a foreign post-recognition 
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marriage.90  As in s 216(2) of the Civil Partnership Act, it is provided in s 21(3) 
of the Gender Recognition Act that if a gender recognition certificate is 
obtained subsequent to a foreign marriage having been entered into, the 
relationship can be regarded as opposite-sex, validating the marriage 
retrospectively.91  That neutralising provision (just like s 216(2)) resolves the 
issue of validity of the marriage when the transgendered party is alive and 
able to seek a gender recognition certificate.  And, as with civil partnership, if 
the issue arises after the death of the transgendered person (say, in relation 
to a question of succession) the Gender Recognition Act cannot be utilised to 
solve the problem.  But in the case of marriage, unlike the case of civil 
partnership, an argument based on A v. West Yorkshire Police would not be 
available because of the biological imperative that the House of Lords insisted 
in Bellinger underpins the very nature of marriage.  In other words, a change 
of gender for the purposes of marriage (and, it may be, marriage only) can 
never be recognised by UK law except through the mechanism of the Gender 
Recognition Act.  If that Act cannot be accessed because the transgendered 
person is dead their relationship, which was a valid opposite-sex marriage in 
New Zealand, will not be recognised here unless UK law finds some means of 
recognising what it insists on regarding as a same-sex marriage: whether this 
is possible is explored in Part Three below. 
 
There is yet another problem.  If, after a change of gender, a person enters 
into what New Zealand law regards as an opposite-sex civil partnership but 
UK law regards as a same-sex relationship because it refuses to recognise 
the acquired gender, then there would be no means of recognition under the 
Civil Partnership Act 2004 because the relationship is not an ³overseas 
relationship´ which by s 212 must be same-sex by the lex loci.92  The 
relationship not being recognised under the 2004 Act, the transgendered 
person would be regarded as single and so (if alive) entitled to seek a gender 
recognition certificate in the UK to have the relationship recognised as 
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acquisition of the gender recognition certificate: s 21(4). 
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 2004 Act, s 212, as discussed above. 
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opposite-sex  -  but that gets the parties nowhere since their relationship 
remains opposite-sex by the lex loci (and thus falls fouls of s 212) and 
becomes opposite-sex by UK law (and additionally falls foul of s 216).  But at 
least in the eyes of both legal systems (and the parties) we would now have 
an opposite-sex civil partnership and possible solutions to the recognition of 
such institutions, outwith the 2004 Act, are discussed above. 
 
 
PART THREE: RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
 
The basic approach of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 is to treat overseas 
same-sex relationships as UK civil partnerships93: and this approach applies 
both to foreign same-sex civil partnerships and to foreign same-sex 
marriages.  For most purposes this approach renders the question of 
recognition of foreign same-sex marriage,94 as opposed to foreign civil 
partnership, unnecessary since the consequences of marriage and civil 
partnership in the UK are substantially similar.  Nevertheless the question of 
recognition of same-sex marriage is not entirely superseded by the Act, for at 
least two reasons.  First, civil partnership does not (yet?) carry the social 
significance and universal acceptability (even desirability) that marriage does. 
This idea of civil partnership as a second-rate institution in social rather than 
in strictly legal terms was the basis of the North American decisions opening 
up marriage to same-sex couples.95  Secondly, there are numerous areas in 
which the Civil Partnership Act 2004 creates a rule that is not identical to the 
equivalent rule in marriage with the result that treating an overseas same-sex 
PDUULDJHDVD8.FLYLOSDUWQHUVKLSLVQRWVDWLVIDFWRU\IURPWKHSDUWLHV¶SRLQWRI
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view.  Currently,96 the most important difference exists in the Scottish parts of 
the 2004 Act, for the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978 has not been amended to 
allow civil partners the right to adopt a child jointly in the way that married 
couples can (or, indeed, in the way that English civil partners can97).  A 
married couple from, say, Spain, will therefore be treated in the UK as married 
and thus able to adopt a child in Scotland if they are opposite-sex, but as 
civilly enpartnered and thus unable to adopt a child in Scotland if they are 
same-sex.  The European Court of Human Rights does not yet regard that 
distinction within the context of adoption as in itself inconsistent with the 
ECHR98.  A further difference between marriage and civil partnership in 
Scotland was created by s 3(3) and (4) of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 
where marriages (but not civil partnerships) are protected from invalidity on 
the ground of foreign formality flaws, if one or both parties is domiciled in 
Scotland.  And another difference between marriage and civil partnership 
(applicable throughout the United Kingdom) concerns adultery as a ground for 
dissolving the union.  This remains a ground for divorce,99 bringing an end to 
the marriage, but it is not a ground for the dissolution of a civil partnership. 
 
 Scenario Eight 
Two Canadian married couples, Paul and David, and Jacob and 
Rebecca, come to live in the UK.  David has sexual intercourse with 
Rebecca.  Jacob can bring his marriage to an end on the ground of his 
VSRXVH¶VDGXOWHU\, because his marriage is treated as a marriage; Paul 
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couple to adopt in that country. 
99
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1976, s 1(2)(a).  There is an important difference in the two domestic provisions in that the 
Scottish provision is absolute while the English provision requires in addition that the 
SHWLWLRQHUILQGVWKHDGXOWHU\³LQWROHUDEOH´ 
 34 
FDQQRW EULQJ KLV PDUULDJH WR DQ HQG RQ WKH JURXQG RI KLV VSRXVH¶V
adultery, because his marriage is treated as a civil partnership. 
 
Paul does of course have the possibility of using another ground for 
dissolution, such as unreasonable behaviour100, but the point is that he does 
not have the choice, which is open to Jacob, to seek a judicial declaration that 
the offence of adultery has been the cause of the breakdown.  The very fact 
that the UK legislature101 has maintained adultery in addition to unreasonable 
behaviour suggests that adultery is seen as something different from such 
behaviour, and an element to divorce law that has continuing significance.102 
  
So, in relation to at least foreign procedural flaws and adoption in Scotland, 
divorce for adultery, and (as we saw earlier) recognition of foreign 
relationships, married couples are potentially treated rather more favourably 
than civil partners.  The effect of the conversion of overseas same-sex 
marriages but not opposite-sex marriages into civil partnerships is to reveal 
this preference as being not for one institution over another, but for one type 
of couple over another.103  In other words, the law prefers (in the sense of 
giving preferential treatment to) opposite-sex couples as opposed to same-
sex couples, and that preference is open to ECHR challenge.104  There is, I 
think, no room for doubt that all consequences of both marriage and civil 
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 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s 44(5)(a) (England and Wales); s 117(3)(a) (Scotland); and s 
168(5)(a) (Northern Ireland). 
101
 And, most recently, the Scottish Parliament which amended the grounds of divorce in the 
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partnership are aspects of family life as understood by article 8(1) of the 
European Convention.  The present paper is not the place for a full 
examination of the KLVWRU\RIWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUW¶VHYROYLQJMXULVSUXGHQFHRQ
same-sex relationships105.  However, it is as well to remind ourselves of some 
highlights.  In Dudgeon v. UK106 the Court held that a complete ban on same-
sex sexual activity was a breach of the right to private life107, and differential 
ages of consent to sexual activity between same-sex and opposite-sex 
partners were declared a breach of articles 8 and 14 in 2003.108  Differential 
treatment on the basis of sexual orientation in a custody dispute was held to 
be contrary to Article 8 in 1999,109 and differential treatment regarding other 
civil rights of a same-sex couple as opposed to an opposite-sex couple in the 
same circumstances was held contrary to Article 8 in Karner v. Austria.110  
Though it has not yet been directly asked whether treating same-sex civil 
partners less favourably than opposite-sex married partners is inconsistent 
with the ECHR, the European Court now very definitely takes the view that, 
just like legal differences based on sex, legal differences based on sexual 
orientation require particularly serious and persuasive reasons by way of 
justification.111 
 
Since the conversion of same-sex marriages into civil partnerships has the 
effect of imposing differential treatment on same-sex couples who marry 
                                                 
105
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abroad as opposed to opposite-sex couples who marry abroad, the effect of 
the jurisprudence summarised above is that the state must provide a 
justifiable reason within the context of article 8(2) for making the distinction.  Is 
the differential treatment, in other words, ³QHFHVVDU\LQDGHPRFUDWLFVRFLHW\´"
Does it achieve a legitimate purpose and is the rule proportionate to that 
purpose?  It would seem clear that the purpose of the rule converting foreign 
same-sex marriages into UK civil partnerships is to maintain the opposite-sex 
character of marriage within the United Kingdom.  As we have seen, the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 does not permit opposite-sex couples to enter into civil 
partnership and the law of marriage was not changed to allow same-sex 
couples to enter that institution.  Most countries that have introduced civil 
partnerships have adopted the same policy (though some, like France and 
New Zealand, even while maintaining marriage as an opposite-sex institution 
have permitted opposite-sex couples access to civil partnership).  Given that 
this is so, it is unlikely that the European Court would hold the purpose of 
maintaining the opposite-sex nature of marriage in domestic law to be an 
illegitimate aim.  But a finding that the aim of the rule is legitimate is not 
sufficient in itself to save it.  In addition, the state must show that the 
conversion rule is a proportionate means of achieving that aim.  The crucial 
question is, therefore, whether the conversion rule is necessary in order to 
achieve the aim of maintaining the opposite-sex nature of marriage within 
domestic law.  I suggest that it is not, for at least two reasons.  First, 
recognition of, and giving effect to, a foreign rule of law is not, other than in 
cases where public policy is at stake, normally regarded as inconsistent with 
the maintenance of a domestic rule of law.  That proposition is, in essence, at 
the heart of all private international law.  For example, the UK divorce law 
maintains a mixture of fault-based and no-fault grounds for divorce: limited 
grounds of divorce are seen as essential to maintain the sanctity of and 
importance to (UK) society of stable marriage.  Yet that does not in itself 
justify a court in the UK from refusing to recognise a divorce based not on 
fault but on free consent112, or even one based on the wishes of one party and 
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ignoring the views of the other (such as many forms of talaq divorces).113  As 
well, the domestic law of the UK refuses to permit polygamous marriages on 
its soil or involving its domiciliaries.  Yet that refusal within the domestic 
sphere is not compromised by the recognition (both by case law and by 
statute) of overseas polygamous marriages.  To argue that to maintain the 
opposite-sex nature of marriage in domestic law requires treating same-sex 
marriage as something lesser is not persuasive in a country that does not 
argue that the monogamous nature of domestic marriage requires treating 
foreign polygamous marriages as something less than marriage.  This is all 
the more so when we remind ourselves that same-sex marriage has more 
affinity with opposite-sex marriage as it is designed and practised today (in 
terms of social relationship between the parties, and the ease of the 
application of the existing rules) than polygamous marriage has.  The second 
reason why the rule converting same-sex marriage into civil partnership is 
disproportionate is that there is no rational connection between the effects of 
the conversion rule and its legitimate aim.  To deny adultery as a ground to 
dissolve a same-sex union, or to allow the ignoring of foreign formalities in 
marriage ceremonies but not civil partnership registrations, or to limit adoption 
to opposite-sex couples does not itself advance any interests of opposite-sex 
unions: it merely preferences them.  These differential effects do not advance 
the aim of maintaining the opposite-sex nature of marriage: they simply 
penalise those who enter a marriage that is not opposite-sex. 
 
For both these reasons, it must follow, in my view, that the conversion rule 
under which foreign same-sex marriages are treated not as marriage but as 
civil partnership, thereby discriminating between same-sex and opposite-sex 
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couples, LVGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHWRWKHDLPRIPDLQWDLQLQJWKH8.¶VFRQFHSWLRQRI
marriage as an opposite-sex institution.  As such, the differential 
consequences of doing so are, I suggest, inconsistent with arts 8 and 14 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
 
PART FOUR: CONCLUSION 
 
It is in my view entirely right and proper that the rules for civil partnership do 
not completely replicate those of marriage, for some rules will be 
inappropriate or fail to address different needs, expectations and 
circumstances of the two types of couple.114  So the question becomes 
whether the different international environment between state-sanctioned 
same-sex relationships and state-sanctioned opposite-sex relationships 
justifies such different private international law rules as have been identified in 
this article. 
 
The major international difference between marriage and civil partnership is 
the universality of the former compared to the territorial limitations of the latter.  
Personal capacity will not arise as a realistic question in jurisdictions with no 
concept of civil partnership115 and for that reason we may conclude that it is 
legitimate to refer capacity to the lex loci registrationis rather than the 
personal law, which may be silent on the issue.  However, the application of 
UK rules of eligibility to all those domiciled in the UK  -  and to their 
prospective partners  -  no matter where the partnership is registered does not 
reflect any international necessity but amounts to no more than the application 
of parochial UK law in place of a foreign rule of law.  Of course UK marriage 
law applies, in both formalities and many aspects of capacity, for marriage 
within the UK and insofar as that is justified the same rule for civil partnership 
cannot be criticised for being discriminatory.  But to apply UK law in the matter 
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of legal capacity (at least in relation to nonage) to foreign partners of UK 
domiciliaries in relation to partnerships created abroad is unprincipled and, in 
Scotland at any rate, discriminatory since that approach does not apply in 
marriage.  In addition, the whole process of converting foreign same-sex 
marriages into domestic civil partnerships is a disproportionate response to a 
domestic political imperative which serves only to confuse personal relations 
and complicate family life in the international context. 
 
Gaps in the legislation are, perhaps, inevitable.  After all, the issue of 
recognition of foreign (opposite-sex) marriage has been one of the most fertile 
sources of litigation in private international law and it is not, therefore, 
surprising that every possible scenario relating to civil partnership cannot be 
resolved by a universal rule.  But it would be a grave (and unsustainable) 
mistake to assume that foreign same-sex (and opposite-sex) civil partnerships 
and same-sex marriages are either recognised under the Act or they are 
nothing.  As explained above, there remains room for the common law to 
perform its traditional role of filling the gaps  -  there will indeed be no 
alternative when the court is faced, as inevitably it will be, with relationships 
WKDWDUHQHLWKHUPDUULDJHQRU³RYHUVHDVUHODWLRQVKLSV´DVQDUURZO\GHILQHG LQ
the Act.  Given the variety of family forms, and the levels of population 
mobility, in the modern world such questions are likely to arise sooner rather 
than later.  The development of same-sex relationship recognition in the 
domestic sphere, by challenging long-held preconceptions of family life, gives 
us the chance to rethink relationship recognition in the international sphere.  
The challenge is to identify when it is truly appropriate to apply a different rule 
to different forms of relationship, free from the all or nothing assumptions 
surrounding traditional marriage.  The Civil Partnership Act 2004 was the 
most significant advance in LGBT equality since the decriminalisation of 
(male) same-sex sexual activity.  The message from Parliament was clear 
and it is now for the courts to build upon that advance and to develop the 
existing rules and principles both in statute and at common law to ensure that 
same-sex couples whose relationships are legally created abroad are 
recognised or not in a way appropriate to their diverse circumstances, and are 
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not subjected to any more complicated regulation of their family lives than 
opposite-sex couples in analogous circumstances. 
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